Control theories for discrete event systems modeled as finite state machines have been well developed to address various fundamental control issues. However, finite state machine model has long suffered from the problem of state explosion that renders it unsuitable for some practical applications. In an attempt to mitigate the state explosion problem, we propose an efficient representation that appends finite sets of variables to finite state machines in modeling discrete event systems. We also present the control synthesis techniques for such finite state machines with variables (FSMwV). We first present our notion and means of control under this representation. We next present our algorithms for both offline and online synthesis of safety control policies. We then apply these results to the control of electric power grids.
Introduction
Modeling and control of discrete event systems (DES) have been studied by control engineers and scientists for more than 25 years. During this period, many modeling approaches have been proposed, including most notably automata or finite state machines [1, 2] , Petri nets [3, 4] and their variations such as vector DES [5, 6] and event graphs [7] , queuing systems [2] and generalized semi-Markov processes [8] .
Among these models, finite state machines are the most straightforward for control. In fact, the supervisory control theory [1,2,9,10] based on finite state machines has been well developed as it addresses the fundamental issues in control of DES. As a result, we now have a good understanding of problems such as controllability, observability, coobservability, normality, decentralization, nondeterminism, etc. We believe that an important reason we have gone this far in a relatively short time period is that we adapted a simple model of finite state machines. Because of this, we can focus our attention on and see the essence of the control problem.
However, finite state machine model has long suffered from the problem of state explosion that renders it unsuitable for some practical applications. For example, to model a buffer of n capacity using a finite state machine would require at least n states. On the other hand, by using an integer variable to describe the content of the buffer, the number of states required can be drastically reduced. Furthermore, in the case that the capacity of the buffer changes, we can simply modify the range of the variable without remodeling the system. Meanwhile, the traditional supervisory control techniques focus on (passively) maintaining system safety and liveness by the means of disabling some controllable events. It has neglected the possibility of actively enforcing certain events that is widely practiced in the control of real world DES applications. Event enforcement can be quite useful in both "driving" the system toward the given objective (e.g., marked states) and actively maintaining system safety.
To mitigate the problem of state explosion, we propose to employ both finite state machines and sets of variables in modeling discrete event systems. We call our representation Finite State Machines with Variables (FSMwV) * . We show that our FSMwV can represent a broader class of discrete event systems with far smaller numbers of discrete states. The definition of our FSMwV is similar to the Extended Finite State Machines (EFSM) described in [11] . However, the EFSM mechanism was developed for the design verification of circuits but not for the modeling of general discrete event systems. Hence, variables in EFSM are mainly for describing the contents of the circuit inputs/outputs rather than for describing system resources and possible time/resource constraints that FSMwV is designed for. Furthermore, neither concepts of system composition nor control synthesis were developed under the EFSM scheme.
Recently, a method using EFSM to implement the supervisory map as an embedded control was developed [12, 13] . The method was extended to decentralized control in [14] . EFSM was also used to verify supervisory control properties in [15] . In [16] , the authors proposed to transform a set of extended automata into a set of ordinary automata with equivalent behaviour, but no control synthesis methods were discussed. [17] developed the supervisory control for concurrent systems with EFSM modeled subsystems. In [18] , a symbolic transition system model was used, which defines the concept of controllability by applying it to the guards of symbolic transitions, instead of to the events. Neither [18] nor [17] investigated the synthesis of optimal (least restrictive) controllers. They also did not consider enforceable events.
In this paper, our focus is on control synthesis using FSMwV. We first extend the scope of the traditional DES control to include both event disablement and event enforcement. We then propose an offline safety control synthesis procedure that takes the advantage of both event disablement and enforcement in order to prevent the controlled system from venturing into the prohibited state space. To address the practical concern of real world implementations, we further present a set of safety control synthesis procedures, based on the limited and/or variable lookahead policies [20, 21] , that generate the control policies online under the FSMwV modeling framework.
The theoretical results on modeling and control of DES using FSMwV are applied to the safety control of electric power distribution network. DES theories have been explored for applications in power systems [22, 23, 24, 25] . Supervisory control using DES was applied and reported in [22] for line restoration. Hybrid automaton and Petri Nets was used to model power systems for handling inverse problems such as parameter uncertainty and parameter estimation [24] . DES was used in [25] to describe cascading events such as blackouts in power systems. A number of potential power system control problems were discussed in [23] . However, most of the results obtained so far in the area are still preliminary. The relevance and applications of DES to power systems remain not so clear [23] . We model a distribution network by an FSMwV in this paper. We consider both conventional uncontrollable loads and controllable loads (such as plug-in hybrid electric vehicles) by using appropriate variables to avoid possible state explosion. A supervisor is then designed to ensure the network is fully utilized and never overloaded.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: We present the FSMwV model and its system composition mechanism in Section 2. Some preliminary work on FSMwV was presented in [19] . In Section 3, we describe our notion and means of control and present an offline safety control synthesis algorithm. In Section 4, we present an online synthesis algorithm (and its variations) for safety control policies. In Section 5, we apply the results to the safety control of power distribution network. We conclude the paper in Section 6.
Finite State Machines with Variables
In this section, we present the modeling mechanism of finite state machines with variables. First, let us recall that a finite state machine (FSM) is described by a 5-tuple [2] 
where Σ is the (finite) event set, Q the (finite) state set, δ: Σ×Q→Q the transition function, the 0 q initial state, and Q m the marked (or final) states.
To introduce variables into an FSM, let p ∈ P be a vector of variables, where P is some vector space. P can be either finite or infinite. More often, P is over the set of natural numbers. We also introduce guards g ∈ G that are predicates on the variables p. The transition function δ can be defined as a function from Σ×Q×G×P to Q×P as illustrated in Figure 1 . The transition shown is to be interpreted as follows: If at state q, the guard g is true and the event σ occurs, then the next state is q' and the values of variables will be updated to f (p). We denote such a transition by ( , ( ) f p respectively.
We note that this definition is an extension to that of FSM [2] . Using this parallel composition, we can build large systems from simple components. This procedure can be automated.
To describe the behaviour of an FSMwV, (Σ, Q, δ, P, G, ( 0 
A trace of a run is the sequence of event transitions in the run 1 2 3 .
That is, s is obtained from r by deleting the state information and dynamic transitions.
If an FSMwV is deterministic (which we assume throughout this paper), then a run is uniquely determined by its trace. That is, we can reconstruct a run by looking at its trace and the FSMwV. The set of all traces of an FSMwV is a language denoted by
This language is called the language generated by FSMwV. The language marked by FSMwV is defined as L m (FSMwV) ={s∈L(FSMwV): the run of s ends in a marked state q∈Q m }.
Since CFSMwV and FSMwV have the same structure, runs, traces, and languages for CFSMwV are defined similarly.
We often use a legal specification E ⊆ R(CFSMwV) to specify the legal behaviour of the system modeled by a CFSMwV: a run r is legal if and only if it belongs to E. We call this type of specifications dynamic specifications. On the other hand, if the legal behaviour is specified in terms of legal and illegal states, that is, a run r is legal if and only if it does not visit any illegal state, then the specification is called a static specification. It is well known in supervisory control [27] that a dynamic specification can always be translated into a static specification (perhaps at the cost of having more states). Therefore, we will use static specifications in safety controller synthesis.
Safety Controller
In this section, we study how to design a safety controller, that is, a controller that guarantees the system will never enter some illegal states. We assume that the system to be controlled is modeled by a CFSMwV:
and the safety requirement is given by a set of illegal states Q b ⊆ Q. Note that the specifications in terms of illegal states are very general and cover a large class of practical situations. For example, we can translate the specification "the variable p shall always be less than a constant c" into an illegal state specification as shown in Figure 4 . The control objective is to make sure that the system never visits any illegal state in Q b . We assume that there are two control mechanisms that can be used to achieve the control objective.
(1) Disablement: Events in Σ c ⊆ Σ can be disabled by a controller. Events σ ∈ Σ c are called controllable events.
(2) Enforcement: Events in Σ f ⊆ Σ can be enforced by a controller. Events σ ∈ Σ f are called enforceable events.
We assume that an uncontrollable event cannot be enforced, that is, (Σ − Σ c )∩Σ f =φ , where φ denotes the empty set. We also assume that the system is deterministic. That is, any transition in CFSMwV can only lead to one state.
The behavior of the uncontrolled system is described by the set of runs generated by CFSMwV, R(CFSMwV). The legal behaviour of the system is described by a subset of runs in R(CFSMwV) that does not visit illegal states:
In order to simplify the analysis and synthesis of controllers, we will treat all transitions, including event transitions and dynamic transitions, in a unified manner. To this end, we introduce an artificial uncontrollable event u σ and extend the event set Σ to include u σ . To simplify the notation, we will still use Σ to denote the expended event set in the rest of the paper.
for the purpose of controller analysis and synthesis and an event transition ( , / :
To investigate the control in a generalized framework, we use generalized control patterns [28] as follows:
This set of control pattern allows two types of control: (1) Disabling some controllable events (that is, those in Σ−γ, if the first disjunction is satisfied); and (2) Enforcing some enforceable events (that is, those in γ, if the second disjunction is satisfied). This is a generalization from pure disablement of standard supervisory control.
Proposition 1:
The set of control patterns Γ is closed under union, that is, for all control patterns 1 2 , (1)
Therefore, Γ is closed under union.
Q.E.D
The controller is defined as a mapping from the set of runs R(CFSMwV) to the set of control pattern Γ:
The behavior of the controlled system, denoted by R(CFSMwV, ψ), is given as follows: 
where K denotes the prefix-closure of K,
The following theorem says that controllability is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a controller.
Theorem 1: Given a system CFSMwV and a specification K ⊆ R(CFSMwV), a controller ψ exists such that R(CFSMwV, ψ) = K if and only if K is closed and controllable.
Proof: (ONLY IF) Let ψ be a controller such that R(CFSMwV, ψ) = K. Clearly K is closed. We show that K is controllable as follows: 
.
This proves the theorem. Q.E.D If the specification E is not controllable, we will find the largest subset of E that is controllable. In fact, we can show that the supremal controllable subset of E always exists. To this end, let us define the set of all controllable subset of E as
C(E)={K ⊆ E: K is closed and controllable with respect to R(CFSMwV) and Γ}.
Then we have the following theorem.
C(E). Therefore, the supremal controllable subset of E, denoted by supC(E), exists.
Obviously K is closed. Since both K 1 and K 2 are controllable, we have
To prove K is controllable, we need to show 
Q.E.D By this result, we can find the least restrictive safety controller that ensures the closed-loop system will never visit illegal states. Our strategy to synthesize the least restrictive safety controller is as follows: Initially, the system can be in any legal state of the system. However, the system may move to an illegal state via some transitions. So it is important to study transitions on the boundary (from a legal state to an illegal state). If a transition is associated with a controllable event (i.e., transition ( , / : ( ), ') q g p f p q σ ∧ = with c σ ∈ Σ ) , then the transition can be disabled and we do not need to worry about it. On the other hand, if a transition is associated with an uncontrollable event, then we must prevent it from occurring by either making sure that its guard is not true or pre-empting the transition with an enforceable event if possible. This implies that we must strengthen (or tighten) the conditions under which the system can stay in legal states. We call these conditions safety conditions. We use I q to denote the safety condition for state q. The key to synthesizing the least restrictive safety controller is to update I q iteratively so that after the procedure converges, the transitions on the boundary are either disabled or pre-empted. To do this formally, let us denote the number of iterations by k. Initially, we let safety condition I q (0)=T for all legal states ( 
Since Q is finite by definition, whether the above iteration will converge (terminate) or not depends on the set P. If P is finite, then the iteration is guaranteed to converge. If P is infinite, then the iteration may or may not converge. In the example below, we show that in some cases even if P is infinite, the iteration still converges.
When the iteration converges, we have I q (k+1) = I q (k). Denote I * q = I q (k+1) = I q (k). We can obtain the controller ψ:R(CFSMwV)→Γ as follows: Let r ∈ R(CFSMwV) be a run ending at (q, p). Then
Clearly ψ(r) ∈ Γ and under this control, the closed-loop system will satisfies safety condition I * q for all legal state q∉Q b . We show that ψ: R(CFSMwV)→Γ is indeed the controller we want.
Theorem 3:
After the iteration converges, the controller ψ: R(CFSMwV)→Γ designed above generates the supremal controllable subset supC(E). In other words, R(CFSMwV, ψ) = supC(E).
Proof:
We need to prove (1) R(CFSMwV, ψ) is controllable; (2) R(CFSMwV, ψ) ⊆ E; and (3) for all other subset K ⊆ R(CFSMwV) such that K is controllable and
R(CFSMwV, ψ) is generated by a controller. By Theorem 1, it is controllable.
During the iteration, all safety conditions are strengthened, that is,
During the iteration, a safety condition is strengthened only if not doing so will result in violation of specification E. Hence, no other controller can generate a larger subset than L(CFSMwV,γ) without violating E. Since K is controllable, by Theorem 1, it can be generated by a controller. Therefore, K is controllable and
Note that we assume that in the controlled system, the transitions enforced by the controller will occur before the occurrence of any uncontrollable transition. This assumption is reasonable because we do not consider time in the FSMwV model. If time is of importance, then we shall use hybrid machine model of [29] rather than FSMwV model. Let us now illustrate the above results by an example.
Example 1: Consider the system described by the CFSMwV in Figure 5 . The CFSMwV has three events α, β, η and one variable p∈P, where P is the set of natural numbers. The illegal state is Q b = {6} (shaded in the figure). The controllable events are Σ c = {β, η}. The enforceable event is Σ f = {η}. Our goal is to synthesize a safety controller to ensure that the system will never enter the illegal state. The results of the iteration process to calculate I q at different states is given in Table 1 and shown in Figure 6 . The control is given as: at state 1 and 2, the controller will disable β if p ≥ 4; at state 3, the controller will enforce η if p ≥ 4; and at state 4, the controller always disables β.
Note that the controlled system can loop between states 1 and 4 infinitely many times. Hence, the value of p can increase unboundedly. This example shows that even if P is infinite (the set of natural numbers), the iteration still converges. 
I 3 *= I 3 (9)= I 3 (8), stop! T F F
Online Safety Controller
As it has been demonstrated in standard supervisory control theory, online synthesis of safety controllers has advantages in various applications. If the system to be controlled is large and complex, then offline control synthesis may not be feasible, because it tries to compute the control actions for all possible states and values of variables. Therefore, for large and complex systems, online synthesis is a good alternative because online synthesis only tries to compute the control action for the current state and the current values of variables. Furthermore, online synthesis can be used even if the system to be controlled is time-varying, while offline synthesis cannot be used for time-varying systems. In this section, we will discuss online synthesis of safety controllers using FSMwV model. To design a safety controller online, we can use either limited lookahead policies or variable lookahead policies [20, 21] . In both cases, a forward looking tree representing all possible future behaviour from the current state is constructed. Since the variable values at the current state are known (under our assumption of full observation), all guards can be evaluated. If a guard is true, the transition will be included in the tree; otherwise, the transition (and its continuation) will be discarded in the tree.
After the tree is constructed, the online control synthesis is similar to that of offline. It is actually simpler because of the following two reasons: (1) there are no loops in the tree structure; and (2) guards of all transitions have been evaluated as either true or false. Transitions with false guards are discarded. As before, dynamic transitions with true guards can be treated as same as uncontrollable event transitions by introducing a fictitious new uncontrollable event u σ .
Since the offline synthesis algorithm has been discussed in the previous section, the key to controller synthesis is to construct the forward looking tree. This is the focus of this section.
During the tree construction, after evaluating guards, transitions of various types are replaced as follows:
F′  → discarded For limited lookahead policies, the tree construction ends after N steps. The legality of the states at the boundary is determined by the attitude used. If the conservative attitude is used, then all the states at the boundary are considered illegal. This guarantees that the resulting control policy is safe. However, conservative attitude may result in a smaller (that is, more restrictive) control policy or even an empty control policy, which means that the controller will have an error. On the other hand, if the optimistic attitude is used, then all the states at the boundary, except those belonging to Q b , are considered legal. This attitude will result in a more flexible control policy. However, it may also lead to an unrecoverable error, as it may be too late for an optimistic controller to prevent some illegal behaviour when it sees illegal states.
For variable lookahead policies, the tree construction will continue until some termination conditions are satisfied. We use the following three termination conditions:
(1) A branch terminates at state q if q is an illegal state; (2) A branch terminates at state q if there is no forcible transition leaving q to a legal state but there is an uncontrollable transition leaving q to an illegal state. In this case, state q is illegal; (3) A branch terminates at state q if all the transitions leaving q are controllable. In this case, state q is legal regardless of the legality of the following states. If the tree construction for variable lookahead policies terminates, that is, if every branch ends with one of the three termination conditions satisfied, then the variable lookahead policy obtained is guaranteed to be safe and least restrictive. In other words, it will achieve the same performance as the controller synthesized offline.
Unlike limited lookahead policies, the tree construction for variable lookahead policies may not terminate. In such cases, we can combine limited lookahead policies with variable lookahead policies. In other words, we construct the tree as in variable lookahead policies until it reaches the N-step boundary. We then use either conservative or optimistic attitude for the boundary state as in limited lookahead policies. With the help of variables p i,i and n i , the dynamic of local load at node i is clearly represented by the FSMwV model without having a large number of states. This FSMwV model clearly shows the relationship among the system status, the penetration of PHEVs and the amount of conventional loads in a more efficient way.
Offline Safety Control
To synthesize a safety controller, two scenarios for event i β − , uncontrollable and enforceable, are considered. We use the method described in Section 3 to calculate safety conditions I q iteratively. We assign the variables as: p i,i,m = 100 kW, p b = 30 kW . Since the iterations are rather involved and time consuming, we write a computer program to do the calculations. When the event i β − is considered as uncontrollable and unenforceable, the safety regions representing safety conditions I q of states N, NB, O and OB are shown in Figure 13 after 101 iterations. We do not show safety conditions I T and I D , because they are simple: I T is always "False" and I D is "False" after the first iteration since the transition from state D to state T is uncontrollable. From Figure 13 , we can see that the safety regions of states N, NB, O and OB are all very small. Intuitively, this is because if the controller cannot unplug PHEVs, then it must be very conservative when it allows PHEVs to charge. The maximal number PHEVs can be charged is only 7. This is the case even if the conventional loads are very low. This means the capacity of the distribution network (and the generation capacity) is not fully utilized. This control is not suitable for the increasing use of PHEVs. When the event i β − is considered as enforceable, the safety regions representing safety conditions I q of states N, NB, O and OB are shown in Figure 14 after 33 iterations. The I D is also "False" after the first iteration. It is clear from Figure 14 that the safety regions of states N, NB, O and OB are much bigger than the uncontrollable scenario. This is because if PHEVs can be unplugged by the controller, then the control of charging of PHEVs becomes more flexible. The control strategy is based on two premises: to guarantee the safety of the system (to avoid entering the illegal states) and to give preference to uncontrollable conventional loads. This control not only ensures the safety of the distribution network, but also takes full advantage of its capacity. It allows as many PHEV to be charged as possible.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented our work on control synthesis under the modeling framework of Finite State Machine with Variables. We have described our extension of the scope of the traditional DES (i.e., supervisory) control to include both event disablement and enforcement for the control of discrete event systems modeled as FSMwV. We have proposed an offline safety control synthesis procedure that takes the advantage of both event disablement and enforcement in order to prevent the controlled system from venturing into illegal states. We have further presented online safety control synthesis procedures based on the limited/variable lookahead policies to address the practical concern of real world implementation. We have also applied the theoretical results to control PHEVs in power distribution networks.
